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Abstract
We present a logic with has both a simple semantics and a cut-free Gentzen-type system on one
hand, and which combines relevance logics, da Costa’s paraconsistent logics, and classical logic on
the other. We further show that the logic has many other nice properties, and that its language is ideal
from the semantic point of view.
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1. Introduction
A (propositional) logic L is paraconsistent with respect to a negation connective ∼ if
whenever P and Q are two distinct atomic variables then
∼P,P L Q
Intuitively (and sometimes practically) the logic(s) we use should be paraconsistent (per-
haps with respect to any unary connective!) on the ground of relevance: why should a
“contradiction” concerning P imply something completely unrelated? There is no won-
der that relevance logics [1,2,13] are paraconsistent with respect to their official negation.
However, relevance logics have the defect that they totally reject extremely useful classical
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these principles can be safely used.1 This is precisely what da Costa’s family of paracon-
sistent logics [10,11] is trying to provide. However, these logics (with the exception of the
3-valued paraconsistent logic J3) have neither convincing semantics nor decent cut-free
proof systems, and their philosophical basis seems to be doubtful. In particular: relevance
considerations are altogether ignored in them. There seems indeed to be little connection
between this family and the family of relevance logics.
The goal of this paper is to present a logic with has both a simple semantics and a cut-
free Gentzen-type system on one hand, and which combines relevance logics, da Costa’s
paraconsistent logics, and classical logic on the other. By “combines” we mean, first of all,
that the main ideas and principles behind these logics are taken into account in our logic,
and provide its basis. As a result, our logic is a combination of these 3 families also in the
technical sense that for each of them it has an important fragment which belongs to that
family.
Our starting point is classical logic. This, after all, is the primary logic, being (at least
conceptually) the simplest logic, and at the same time the metalogic used for investigating
all other logics (as is revealed by any examination of almost all works on non-classical
logics). Now classical logic is actually based on the following two principles:
(T) Whatever is not absolutely true is false.
(F) Whatever is not absolutely false is true.
These two intuitive principles might look fuzzy, but they can be translated into completely
precise ones using the semantic framework of matrices, which is general enough for char-
acterizing every propositional logic (by a famous theorem from [16]).
Definition 1. A matrix M for a propositional language L is a triple 〈M,D,O〉, where
M is a nonempty set (of “truth values”), ∅ ⊂ D ⊂ M (D is the subset of “designated”
values), and O includes an operation ˜ :Mn → M for every n-ary connective  of L.
A valuation in a matrix M is a function v :L→ M which respects the operations, i.e.:
v((ψ1, . . . ,ψn)) = ˜(v(ψ1), . . . , v(ψn)) for every connective  of L. Such a valuation v
is called a model in M of a formula ψ if v(ψ) ∈ D. We say that ϕ follows in M from a
theory T (T 	M ϕ) if every model inM of all the formulas of T is also a model of ϕ.M
is a characteristic matrix for a logic L if 	L =	M, and it is weakly characteristic for L if
they have the same tautologies, i.e.: for all ψ , 	L ψ iff 	M ψ .
The conditions in Definition 1 concerning the set D imply that M contains at least two
different truth values, 
 and ⊥, so that 
 ∈ D while ⊥ /∈ D (note that this assumption
excludes trivial “logics”). We may take these two elements as denoting absolute truth and
falsehood. This leads to the following interpretations of the terms used in the formulation
of (T) and (F) above:
1 It has been noted by the referee, that a safe condition for the use of disjunctive syllogism can be seen in [18].
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• “ϕ is absolutely true” means v(ϕ) = 
,
• “ϕ is false” means v(ϕ) /∈ D,
• “ϕ is absolutely false” means v(ϕ) = ⊥.
With this interpretations the two classical principles reduce to:
Principle (T): D = {
}.
Principle (F): D = M − {⊥}.
Note that together with the condition ⊥ = 
 (which we henceforth assume) each of these
principles already implies that 
 ∈ D while ⊥ /∈ D, and that whatever is absolutely true is
true, and whatever is absolutely false is false. Together the two principles imply that M =
{
,⊥}, and we get the classical, bivalent semantics. 
 and ⊥ may indeed be identified with
the classical truth values, and we shall henceforth make this identification. Accordingly,
we shall take ⊥ = ∼
 as a necessary condition for a unary connective ∼ to serve as a
“negation” (and usually also that 
 = ∼⊥, so that ∼ behaves exactly like classical negation
on the classical truth values).
After formulating the two classical principles in precise terms we immediately see that
paraconsistency is in a direct conflict with Principle (T). This principle easily implies that
{∼P,P } can have no model.2 Hence every model of {∼P,P } is a model of any Q, and
so ∼P,P 	L Q in any logic whose semantics obeys Principle (T). Since most of the
more famous logics (like Classical Logic, Intuitionistic Logic, Kleene’s three-valued logic,
Łukasiewicz’ many-valued logics, other fuzzy logics, and many others) adopt this princi-
ple, all these logics are not paraconsistent with respect to their official negation.
It follows from the above discussion that any paraconsistent logic should be based on a
many-valued semantics in which there exist (at least) one designated element 
 such that
⊥ = ∼
 /∈ D, and (at least) one element I such that both I and ∼I are in D (such truth
values correspond to contradictory, or “paradoxical” propositions). The most economic
many-valued structures with these properties are those in which there are exactly 3 truth
values {
,⊥, I }, with D = {
, I }, and ∼I = I . The famous paraconsistent logic J3 of
[4,12,14,20] is indeed based on such a 3-valued structure. Moreover: although J3 rejects
Principle (T), it still adheres to Principle (F). However, J3 has the defect that it does not take
relevance into consideration: any two paradoxical propositions are equivalent according to
this logic. In order to avoid this, but still keep at least one of the two classical principles,
we should allow for more than one paradoxical truth-value. The most natural alternative
is to have a potentially infinite number of them. Paradoxical propositions that get different
paradoxical truth-value should then be considered as irrelevant to each other.
What logical connectives (in addition to negation) should be used in a logic which is
based on such structures? We suggest two main criteria. The main one (which we think
is absolutely necessary) is symmetry: there should be no way to distinguish between two
2 Note that for this conclusion it suffices to assume that ∼
 = 
. This condition is equivalent (in case principle
(T) is respected) to the condition that P  ∼P for some P , and this is a less-than-minimal condition for any
“negation”!
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tions: a formula may be assigned a given paradoxical value only if all its constituents are
assigned that paradoxical value (this property fails of course in the presence of extensional
connectives, and this is one of our reasons for rejecting the use of such connectives in the
framework of relevance logic).
In Section 2 of this paper we describe the semantics, language and consequence relation
of the logic to which the above ideas lead. The main result there is that the connectives
which are definable in the language of that logic are exactly those that meet the two criteria
mentioned above. In Section 3 we present proof systems for the logic. The most important
among them is the hypersequential Gentzen-type system GSRMIm. In the main theorem of
this section we simultaneously show the strong completeness of GSRMIm for the logic, as
well as the fact that the cut rule and the external contraction rule can both be eliminated
from it (this fact allows for very direct proofs of valid hypersequents, and has several useful
applications). In Section 4 we use this system to show that relevance logic, paraconsistent
logic, and classical logic can all be viewed as fragments of our logic, and discuss some
further connections between these logics and ours.
The work described in this paper is a continuation of [3] and [9], and some results from
these papers are reproved here (usually by new methods) in order that the reader will have
the full picture. The paper is nevertheless self-contained, and its main results are new.
2. The language and its semantics
Definition 2. The pure intensional propositional language3 IL is the language {∼,⊗},
where ∼ is a unary connective, and ⊗ is binary.4 The full intensional language IL⊥ is
{∼,⊗,⊥}, where ⊥ is a propositional constant.
We next describe our intended algebraic semantics for IL and IL⊥. For simplicity, we
use the same symbols for the connectives of the languages and for their algebraic counter-
parts.
Definition 3.
(1) The structure Aω = 〈Aω,∼,⊗〉 is defined as follows:
(i) Aω = {
,⊥, I1, I2, I3, . . .}.
(ii) ∼
 = ⊥, ∼⊥ = 
, ∼Ik = Ik (k = 1,2, . . .).
(iii) a ⊗ b =
{⊥ a = ⊥ or b = ⊥,
Ik a = b = Ik,

 otherwise.
(2) An (n 0) is the substructure of Aω which consists of {
,⊥, I1, . . . , In}.
3 The terminology is from Relevance Logic. [15] uses the term “multiplicative” instead of “intensional”.
4 ∼ and ⊗ are called intensional negation and conjunction, respectively. The notation ∼ is from relevance
logic, while ⊗ is taken from [15].
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Aω such that (v(⊥) = ⊥ and) v(∼ϕ) = ∼v(ϕ), v(ϕ ⊗ψ) = v(ϕ)⊗ v(ψ) for all ϕ,ψ .
(4) For T and ϕ in IL (IL⊥), T 	Aω ϕ iff for every valuation v in Aω, if v(ψ) = ⊥
for all ψ ∈ T then v(ϕ) = ⊥. In particular ϕ is valid in Aω (	Aω ϕ) iff v(ϕ) = ⊥ for
every valuation v in Aω. 	An and validity in An are defined similarly.
Note. Aω, which was first introduced in [3], can of course be taken as a matrix which
is based on Principle (F) (i.e.: its set of designated elements is Aω − {⊥}). A1 was first
introduced in [21], and in that paper the set of IL-formulas which are valid in it was
axiomatized. It is known, therefore, as Sobocin´ski 3-valued logic. 	A1 is also known to be
([1]) the purely intensional fragment of the semi-relevant system RM . 	A0 is, of course,just classical logic. In [3,9] it is proved that 	Aω is decidable, that any nontrivial logic in
IL (or IL⊥) which properly extends it is identical to 	An for some 0  n < ω, and that
each 	An (0 n < ω) is a proper extension of 	An+1 .
The following are important connectives from relevance logic which are definable in
IL:
(1) ϕ → ψ = ∼(ϕ ⊗ ∼ψ).
(2) ϕ ↔ ψ = (ϕ → ψ)⊗ (ψ → ϕ).
(3) ϕ +ψ = ∼ϕ → ψ .
The following properties of these connectives can easily be established:
Lemma 1. The connective → corresponds in Aω to the following function:
a → b =
{
 a = ⊥ or b = 
,
Ik a = b = Ik,
⊥ otherwise.
Lemma 2. ⊗, +, and → behave on {
,⊥} like the classical conjunction, disjunction, and
implication (respectively). Moreover: v(ϕ +ψ) = 
 iff either v(ϕ) = 
 or v(ψ) = 
.
Lemma 3. a ↔ b = ⊥ iff a = b.
The main goal of the rest of this section is to provide in the context of Aω a precise
formulation of the symmetry and isolation conditions described in the Introduction, and to
show that the expressive power of IL and IL⊥ exactly corresponds to these conditions.
For this we need first some notations, definitions and lemmas.
Notations.
(1) Let ψ be a formula. We denote by At(ψ) the set of atomic variables that occur in ψ .
(2) Let At(ψ) = {p1, . . . , pn}, where p1, . . . , pn are the first n atomic variables. We denote
by gψ the function from Anω to Aω that corresponds to ψ (i.e., if x = (x1, . . . , xn) then
gψ(x) = vx(ψ), where vx is a valuation in Aω such that vx(pi) = xi for 1 i  n).
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S[ψ] = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Anω | gψ(a1, . . . , an) = ⊥}.
(4) Denote by Ink the n-tuple (Ik, Ik, . . . , Ik). Let I (n) = {Ink | k ∈N }.
Definition 4. An n-ary operation F on Aω (Ak) satisfies the symmetry condition if
F
(
h(x1), . . . , h(xn)
)= h(F(x1, . . . , xn))
for all x1, . . . , xn ∈ Aω (Ak) and for every injective function h from Aω to Aω (Ak to Ak)
such that h(
) = 
 and h(⊥) = ⊥.
Lemma 4. If ψ is in IL⊥ and At(ψ) = {p1, . . . , pn} then gψ satisfies the symmetry con-
dition.
Proof. Since gψ is obtained from the functions ∼, ⊗, the constant functions λx. ⊥, and
the projection functions (including identity) using composition, it suffices to check that
all these functions satisfy the symmetry condition, and that composition preserves this
property. This is easy. 
Definition 5. Let F be an n-ary operation on Aω (Al).
(1) F satisfies the isolation condition if for every k, F(x) = Ik only if x = Ink .
(2) F satisfies the strong isolation condition if for every k, F(x) = Ik iff x = Ink .
Lemma 5.
(1) If ψ is in IL⊥ and At(ψ) = {p1, . . . , pn} then gψ satisfies the isolation condition.
(2) If ψ is in IL and At(ψ) = {p1, . . . , pn} then gψ satisfies the strong isolation condition.
Proof. By induction on the structure of ψ . 
Corollary 1. If ψ is in IL⊥, At(ψ) = {p1, . . . , pn}, and x /∈ I (n), then gψ(x) ∈ {
,⊥}.
Corollary 2. If ψ is in IL, and At(ψ) = {p1, . . . , pn}, then I (n) ⊆ S[ψ].
Lemma 6. Let (in IL⊥) 
 = ∼⊥. If ψ is in IL⊥ and v is a valuation in Aω then:
v(
 ⊗ψ) =
{⊥ v(ψ) = ⊥,

 v(ψ) = ⊥, v(
 → ψ) =
{
 v(ψ) = 
,
⊥ v(ψ) = 
.
Lemma 7. Let 
n = (p1 → p1)⊗ (p2 → p2)⊗ · · · ⊗ (pn → pn). Then
g
n(x) =
{
Ik x = Ink ,
 x /∈ I (n).
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(1) ⋂ki=1 S[ψi] = S[ψ1 ⊗ψ2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ψk].
(2) ⋃ki=1 S[ψi] = S[
 ⊗ψ1 +
⊗ψ2 + · · · +
 ⊗ψk].
(3) If ψi is in IL for all 1 i  k then
⋃k
i=1 S[ψi] = S[ψ1 +ψ2 + · · · +ψk].
Proof. Immediate from the definition of ⊗, Lemmas 2 and 6, and Corollaries 1 and 2. 
Definition 6. We say that b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ Anω is similar to a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Anω if
there exists an injective function h from Aω to Aω such that h(
) = 
, h(⊥) = ⊥, and
h(ai) = bi for 1 i  n.
The proof of the following two lemmas is straightforward:
Lemma 9. Similarity of tuples is an equivalence relation.
Lemma 10. b is similar to a iff the following conditions are satisfied for all 1 i, j  n:
• If ai = 
 then bi = 
.
• If ai = ⊥ then bi = ⊥.
• If ai ∈ I (1) then bi ∈ I (1).
• If ai = aj then bi = bj .
• If ai = aj then bi = bj .
Corollary 3. Every b ∈ Anω is similar to some a ∈ Ann.
Definition 7. A subset C ⊆ Anω is characterizable in IL⊥ (IL) if C = S[ψ] for some
formula ψ of IL⊥ (IL) such that At(ψ) = {p1, . . . , pn}.
We turn next to our two major lemmas.
Lemma 11. C ⊆ Anω is characterizable in IL⊥ if b ∈ C whenever b is similar to some
a ∈ C.
Proof. By Lemma 9 and Corollary 3, if C has this property then C =⋃a∈Ann∩C S a where
S a is the set of tuples which are similar to a. By Lemma 8 it remains therefore to prove
that S a is characterizable in IL⊥ for all a ∈ Anω. By Lemma 10, S a = (
⋂
1in S
a
i ) ∩
(
⋂
1i,jn S
a
i,j ), where
S ai =

{x ∈ Anω | xi = 
} ai = 
,
{x ∈ Anω | xi = ⊥} ai = ⊥,
{x ∈ Anω | xi ∈ I (1)} ai ∈ I (1);
S ai,j =
{ {x ∈ Anω | xi = xj } ai = aj ,
{x ∈ An | x = x } a = a .ω i j i j
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a
i,j are characterizable in IL⊥ for
all i and j . This follows from the following equations, which easily follow from Lemmas 3,
6, and 7:5{x ∈ Anω | xi = 
}= S[(
n ⊗ 
) → pi],{x ∈ Anω | xi = ⊥}= S[(
n ⊗ 
) → ∼pi],{x ∈ Anω | xi ∈ I (1)}= S[(
n ⊗ 
)⊗ (pi ⊗ ∼pi)],{x ∈ Anω | xi = xj}= S[(
n ⊗ 
)⊗ (pi ↔ pj )],{x ∈ Anω | xi = xj}= S[(
n ⊗ 
) → ∼(pi ↔ pj )]. 
Lemma 12. A subset C ⊆ Anω is characterizable in IL if it satisfies the following two
conditions:
• I (n) ⊆ C.
• If a ∈ C and b is similar to a then b ∈ C.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 11. The main difference is that because of
the extra condition, S a in the equation C = ⋃a∈Ann∩C S a can be taken this time to be
the union of I (n) and the set of tuples which are similar to a. Again by Lemma 8 it
remains therefore to prove that this S a is characterizable in IL for all a ∈ Anω. Again
S a = (⋂1in S ai )∩ (⋂1i,jn S ai,j ), where this time:
S ai =

I (n)∪ {x ∈ Anω | xi = 
} ai = 
,
I (n)∪ {x ∈ Anω | xi = ⊥} ai = ⊥,
{x ∈ Anω | xi ∈ I (1)} ai ∈ I (1);
S ai,j =
{
I (n)∪ {x ∈ Anω | xi = xj } ai = aj ,
I (n)∪ {x ∈ Anω | xi = xj } ai = aj .
The fact that these S ai and S
a
i,j are characterizable in IL for all i and j follows from the
following easily established equations:
I (n)∪ {x ∈ Anω | xi = 
}= S[
n → pi],
I (n)∪ {x ∈ Anω | xi = ⊥}= S[
n → ∼pi],{x ∈ Anω | xi ∈ I (1)}= S[
n ⊗ pi ⊗ ∼pi],
I (n)∪ {x ∈ Anω | xi = xj}= S[
n ⊗ (pi ↔ pj )],
I (n)∪ {x ∈ Anω | xi = xj}= S[
n → ∼(pi ↔ pj )]. 
Note. It is easy to see that the converse implications in Lemmas 11 and 12 are also true.
5 The reason for using 
n in these equations is to make sure that we use only formulas ψ s.t. A(ψ) =
{p1, . . . , pn}.
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(1) An n-ary operation F on Aω (Ak) is definable in IL by a formula ψ in the distinct
propositional variables p1, . . . , pn (i.e., F = gψ ) iff it satisfies both the symmetry con-
dition and the strong isolation condition.
(2) An n-ary operation F on Aω (Ak) is definable in IL⊥ by a formula in the distinct
propositional variables p1, . . . , pn iff it satisfies both the symmetry condition and the
isolation condition.
Proof. The necessity parts have been shown in Lemmas 4 and 5. For the converse assume
first that F satisfies the conditions of symmetry and strong isolation. It follows that the set
E = {x ∈ Anω | F(x) = ⊥} satisfies the two conditions from Lemma 12. Hence E = S[ψF ]
for some formula ψF in IL. We show now that F = gψF . We consider 3 cases:
• If F(x) = Ik for some k then (by isolation) x = Ink , and since ψF is in IL it follows
that gψF (x) = Ik = F(x).• If F(x) = ⊥ then x /∈ E. Hence x /∈ S[ψF ], and so gψF (x) = ⊥ = F(x).• If F(x) = 
 then x ∈ E = S[ψF ], and (by strong isolation) x /∈ I (n). Hence gψF (x) =⊥, and (by isolation) gψF (x) /∈ I (1). It follows that gψF (x) = 
 = F(x).
Assume now that F satisfies symmetry and isolation. If F(x) /∈ {
,⊥} for some x ∈ Anω
then these two conditions together imply that F actually satisfies strong isolation as well.
Hence F is definable in this case by a formula in IL (by what we have just proved).
Assume therefore that F(x) ∈ {
,⊥} for all x ∈ Anω. Since F satisfies the symmetry con-
dition, Lemma 11 entails that E = S[ψF ] for some formula ψF in IL⊥, where again
E = {x ∈ Anω | F(x) = ⊥}. It is easy now to see that our assumptions on F imply that
F = g
⊗ψF . 
Corollary 4. An n-ary operation F on A1 is definable in IL⊥ (IL) by a formula ψ in the
distinct propositional variables p1, . . . , pn iff it satisfies the (strong) isolation condition.
Proof. The symmetry condition is trivially true for any operation on A1. 
Of the two conditions we have imposed on the connectives of our languages the more
fundamental one is no doubt the symmetry condition. This condition seems to us absolutely
essential for any logical language which is based on Aω. It is interesting therefore to note
that a finite set of connectives which is functionally complete for the set of operations
which satisfy this condition can be obtained from IL⊥ by adding one extra binary connec-
tive which again is closely related to one which is used in relevance logic.
Definition 8. The partial order r is defined on Aω by: ⊥r Ik r 
.
Lemma 13. The structure 〈Aω,r 〉 is a lattice. Moreover: a → b = ⊥ iff a r b.
Definition 9. a ∨ b = sup (a, b), a ∧ b = infr (a, b).r
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∼b). Hence it suffices to add just one of them to the language.
Note. ⊗ itself can be defined as info (a, b), where ⊥o 
o Ik .
Theorem 2. An n-ary operation F on Aω is definable in {∼,⊗,⊥,∨} by a formula ψ in
the distinct propositional variables p1, . . . , pn iff it satisfies the symmetry condition.6
Proof. It is easy to see that every operation which is definable in {∼,⊗,⊥,∨} satisfies
the symmetry condition. For the converse, assume that the n-ary operation F satisfies this
condition. This implies that the sets {x ∈ Anω | F(x) = 
}, {x ∈ Anω | F(x) ∈ I (1)}, and
{x ∈ Anω | x is similar to a} (where a ∈ Anω) all satisfy the condition from Lemma 11, and
so they are characterizable in IL⊥ by formulas ψ
, ψI and ψa (respectively). By moving
if necessary from ψ to 
 ⊗ ψ we may assume that all these formulas take values only in
{
,⊥}. The symmetry condition entails also that if F(a) = Ik then Ik = ai(a) for some
1 i(a) n,7 and that F(x) = xi(a) = xi(x) for every x which is similar to a. This entails
that F = g(ψF ) where
ψF = ψ
 ∨
(
ψI ∧
∨
a∈Ann∩{x∈Anω|F(x)∈I (1)}
(
ψa ∧ pi(a)
))
.
Indeed, if F(x) = 
 then gψ
(x) = 
, and so gψF (x) = 
. If F(x) = ⊥ then gψ
(x) = ⊥
and gψI (x) = ⊥, and so gψF (x) = ⊥. Finally, if F(x) = xi(x) ∈ I (1) then gψ
(x) = ⊥,
gψI (x) = 
, gψa∧pi(a) (x) = ⊥ for every a ∈ Ann ∩ {x ∈ Anω | F(x) ∈ I (1)} which is not
similar to x, while gψa∧pi(a) (x) = xi(a) = xi(x) for every a ∈ Ann ∩ {x ∈ Anω | F(x) ∈ I (1)}
which is similar to x. It follows that gψF (x) = xi(x) = F(x) in this case as well. 
Note. Using where necessary 
n instead of 
, one can prove in a similar way that
the n-ary operations F which are definable in {∼,⊗,∨} by a formula ψ such that
A(ψ) = {p1, . . . , pn}, are precisely those which satisfy the symmetry condition as well
as the condition F(Ink ) = Ik .
Similar proofs can be used to show that an operation F on A1 is definable in {∼,⊗,
⊥,∨} iff it is classically closed (i.e.: if {x1, , . . . , , xn} ⊆ {
,⊥}, then F(x1, , . . . , , xn) ∈
{
,⊥}), and that such F is definable in {∼,⊗,∨} iff it is both classically closed and free
(i.e.: F(In) = I ).
6 Note that this theorem is valid only in the infinite case, but not in Ak for k < ω!
7 This is the step in the proof which fails for Ak in case k is finite!
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3.1. Gentzen-type systems
We use simplified versions of the Gentzen-type calculi introduced in [3] and [9]. Un-
like the systems there, we employ here sequents of the form Γ ⇒ ∆ where Γ and ∆ are
finite sets (rather than sequences or multisets) of formulas (so that the structural rules of
contraction, its converse, and permutation are all built in). As usual, we write Γ,∆ and
Γ,ϕ instead of Γ ∪∆ and Γ ∪ {ϕ} (respectively). We use P,Q,p,q as metavariables for
propositional variables (i.e.: atomic formulas other than ⊥), ϕ,ψ,A,B,C as variables for
arbitrary formulas, and s as a variable for sequents.
Our main system uses hypersequents as the main data structure. We start however with
the following ordinary sequential calculus from [3], on which our main system is based.
The system GRMIm.8
Axioms:
P ⇒ P ⊥,Γ ⇒ ∆
Logical rules:
(¬ ⇒) Γ ⇒ ∆,ϕ¬ϕ,Γ ⇒ ∆
ϕ,Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆,¬ϕ (⇒ ¬)
(⊗ ⇒) Γ,ϕ,ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ,ϕ ⊗ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, ϕ Γ2 ⇒ ∆2,ψ
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆1,∆2, ϕ ⊗ψ (⇒ ⊗)
Note. In the axiom for ⊥ we may (and will) assume that Γ and ∆ are sets of atomic
formulas.
The system GRMm is defined like GRMIm, but its axioms are the sequents of the form
Γ ⇒ Γ where Γ is a finite set of atomic formulas.
Notes.
(1) It is important to note that all the rules of this system are multiplicative (or pure, in the
terminology of [6]). This means that from any correct application of a rule one can get
another correct application of that rule by adding arbitrary finite sets to one side of the
premises (not necessarily the same set to each premise!) and the union of these sets to
the same side of the conclusion. In other words: the rules are context-free.
(2) It is easy to show that both GRMIm and GRMm are closed under substitutions. Hence
we could have taken the axioms of GRMIm to be ϕ ⇒ ϕ for every ϕ (Γ ⇒ Γ for every
Γ in the case of GRMm), and ⊥,Γ ⇒ ∆ for every pair of finite sets Γ,∆ of arbitrary
formulas.
8 This system was called GRMI⊥m in [9], while the name GRMIm was used there for the fragment without ⊥.
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multiplicative versions of the classical rules for implication and disjunction (respec-
tively). Thus the rules for + are just the duals of the rules for ⊗.
(4) Another rule that was taken in [3] as primitive is the cut rule. It is easy however to
use Gentzen’s original method to show that it is eliminable in both systems (see [3]).
Below we shall present a new, semantic proof of this fact (see Corollary 8).
Notation. At(E) denotes the sets of atomic formulas (i.e.: atomic variables or ⊥) which
occur in E (here E can be a formula, a sequent, or a hypersequent).
Lemma 14. GRMIm and GRMm are closed under the strong expansion rule: If Γ ⇒ ∆ is
provable and At(ϕ) ⊆ At(Γ ⇒ ∆) then also ϕ,Γ ⇒ ∆ and Γ ⇒ ∆,ϕ are provable.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base case (where ϕ is atomic) is done
by an inner induction on the length of the proof of Γ ⇒ ∆. The base case of this inner
induction uses the special form of the axioms of GRMIm, while both induction steps (that
of the inner induction and that of the main one) rely on the multiplicativity of the rules. 
Lemma 15.
(1) GRMIm is closed under the strong mingle rule: If At(Γ1 ⇒ ∆1) ∩ At(Γ2 ⇒ ∆2) = ∅,
and both Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 and Γ2 ⇒ ∆2 are provable in GRMIm, then so is Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆1,∆2.
(2) GRMm is closed under the mix (or combining) rule: If both Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 and Γ2 ⇒ ∆2
are provable in GRMm, then so is Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆1,∆2.
Proof. By induction on the sum of the lengths of the proofs of Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 and Γ2 ⇒ ∆2
(again the special axioms of GRMIm and GRMm are used for the base case, while the
multiplicativity of the rules is used for the induction step). 
In [3] (and in Corollary 8 below) it is proved that GRMIm is weakly sound and com-
plete with respect to Aω, in the sense that 	Aωϕ iff 	GRMIm⇒ ϕ. The same is true for
GRMm with respect to A1. Neither system is strongly complete, though (see [9]). Thus
ϕ ⊗ ψ 	Aω ϕ, but GRMm ϕ ⊗ ψ ⇒ ϕ. In order to get strong completeness we need (like
in [9]) to use calculi of hypersequents. A hypersequent is a finite multiset of ordinary se-
quents. The elements of this multiset are called its components. We denote by s1| · · · |sn
the hypersequent whose components are s1, . . . , sn, and use G as a variable for (possibly
empty) hypersequents.9
Definition 10. The n-part of a hypersequential calculus or a logic is the fragment in which
only hypersequents with at most n components are allowed.
9 Hypersequents were first introduced by Pottinger in [19], and independently in [5]. Related structures were
used before by Mints (see [17]).
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Axioms:
P ⇒ P
Logical rules:
(¬ ⇒) G | Γ ⇒ ∆,ϕ
G | ¬ϕ,Γ ⇒ ∆
G | ϕ,Γ ⇒ ∆
G | Γ ⇒ ∆,¬ϕ (⇒ ¬)
(⊗ ⇒) G | Γ,ϕ,ψ ⇒ ∆
G | Γ,ϕ ⊗ψ ⇒ ∆
G | Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, ϕ G | Γ2 ⇒ ∆2,ψ
G | Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆1,∆2, ϕ ⊗ψ (⇒ ⊗)
Structural rules:
G | s | s
G | s
G | Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, ϕ G | ϕ,Γ2 ⇒ ∆2
G | Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆1,∆2
G | Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆1,∆2
G | Γ1 ⇒ ∆1|Γ2,Γ ′ ⇒ ∆2,∆′
(external contraction, cut, and strong splitting, respectively).
The system GSRMm. Similar to GSRMIm, but with axioms like in GRMm.
Note. Unlike in [9], we use here the externally additive versions of the rules which
have more than one premise (this means that both premises have the same inactive side-
hypersequent G).10 This is equivalent to the externally multiplicative versions of [9],
because of the presence of external contraction and external weakening (the latter, which
allows to infer G | s from G, is a special case of strong splitting). We shall show that this
formulation of the rules makes the problematic rule of external contraction superfluous.
The semantics of these hypersequential calculi is given in the next definition.
Definition 11.
(1) A valuation v is a model in Aω of a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ if either v(ϕ) = ⊥ for some
ϕ ∈ Γ , or v(ψ) = 
 for some ψ ∈ ∆, or Γ ⇒ ∆ is not empty and there exists k such
that v(ϕ) = Ik for all ϕ ∈ Γ ∪ ∆, or Γ ⇒ ∆ is empty and there exists k such that
v(P ) = Ik for some atomic P (i.e.: v is a model of the empty sequent iff it is not a
classical valuation).
(2) A valuation v is a model of a hypersequent G in Aω (v|=AωG) if v is a model in Aω
of at least one of the components of G.
(3) A hypersequent G is valid in Aω (	hAωG) if every valuation in Aω is a model of G.(4) The concepts of model and validity in A1 are defined similarly.
10 Note that internally cut and (⇒ ⊗) still have a multiplicative form!
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Theorem 3 (Soundness theorem).
(1) The axioms of GSRMIm (GSRMm) are valid in Aω (A1), and all its rules are truth
preserving: every model of all the premises of a rule is also a model of its conclusion.
(2) If 	GSRMImG then 	hAωG. If 	GSRMmG then 	hA1G.
Proof. The second part is immediate from the first, while the proof of the first is straight-
forward. We only note that the cut rule is nontrivially sound here even in case the resulting
component is empty. Indeed, v can be a model of both ⇒ ϕ and ϕ ⇒ only if v(ϕ) = Ik for
some k. Such v is not a classical valuation, and so it is a model of ⇒ as well. 
3.2. Completeness and cut elimination
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 4. A hypersequent G is valid in Aω iff G has a proof in GSRMIm in which the
cut rule and the external contraction rule are not used.
This subsection is mainly devoted to a proof of this theorem. For convenience, in the
rest of it 	 G means that G has a proof in GSRMIm in which cut and external contraction
are not used.
Definition 12. A hypersequent Γ ′1 ⇒ ∆′1 | · · · | Γ ′n ⇒ ∆′n relevantly extends the hyperse-
quent Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 | · · · | Γn ⇒ ∆n if for all 1  i  n we have that Γi ⊆ Γ ′i , ∆i ⊆ ∆′i , and
every formula in Γ ′i ⇒ ∆′i is a subformula of some formula in Γi ⇒ ∆i .
Lemma 16. Relevant extension is a transitive relation: if G1 relevantly extends G2, and
G2 relevantly extends G3, then G1 relevantly extends G3.
Lemma 17. A model of a hypersequent G is also a model of every relevant extension of G.
Proof. Let v be a model of G and let G′ be a relevant extension of G. Then v is a model
of some component Γi ⇒ ∆i of G. If v(ψ) = ⊥ for some ψ ∈ Γi , or v(ψ) = 
 for some
ψ ∈ ∆i , then the same is true for the corresponding component Γ ′i ⇒ ∆′i of G′. If v(ψ) =
Ik for all formulas of Γi ⇒ ∆i , or if Γi ⇒ ∆i is empty, then the same is again true for
Γ ′i ⇒ ∆′i , since it consists only of subformulas of formulas in Γi ⇒ ∆i . In either case v is
also a model of Γ ′i ⇒ ∆′i and so of G′. 
Notation. Let Γi ⇒ ∆i be a component of the hypersequent G. Denote by Gi the hyper-
sequent which is obtained from G by deleting Γi ⇒ ∆i (and so G = Γi ⇒ ∆i | Gi up to
the order of the components. Note also that Gi may be empty).
Definition 13. Let G be a hypersequent such that  G. G is called saturated if every
component Γi ⇒ ∆i of G satisfies the following conditions:
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(ii) If ¬ϕ ∈ ∆i then ϕ ∈ Γi .
(iii) If ϕ ⊗ψ ∈ Γi then ϕ ∈ Γi and ψ ∈ Γi .
(iv) If ϕ ⊗ψ ∈ ∆i and Γi ⇒ ∆i,ϕ | Gi then ϕ ∈ ∆i .
(v) If ϕ ⊗ψ ∈ ∆i and Γ ⇒ ∆i,ψ | Gi then ψ ∈ ∆i .
Lemma 18. If G then G has an unprovable, saturated relevant extension.
Proof. If G and G is not saturated then it is possible to properly and relevantly extend
G without making the new hypersequent provable (this is obvious and standard if one of
the conditions (i)–(iii) is violated by some component Γ ⇒ ∆ of G, and is trivial in the
special cases (iv)–(v)). Since G has only finitely many subformulas, this process must stop
by Lemma 16 with a saturated sequent which relevantly extends G. 
Lemma 19. Every unprovable saturated hypersequent has a countermodel in Aω.
Proof. Let G = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1 | · · · | Γn ⇒ ∆n be an unprovable saturated sequent. Define:
Γ =
n⋃
i=1
Γi, ∆ =
n⋃
i=1
∆i,
I (G) = {p ∈ At(G) | p ∈ Γ ∩∆},
R = {〈p,q〉 ∈ I (G)2 | ∃Γ ′ ⊆ Γ ∃∆′ ⊆ ∆.	GRMImΓ ′ ⇒ ∆′ and
{p,q} ⊆ At(Γ ′ ⇒ ∆′)}.
We first show that R is an equivalence relation. That R is reflexive follows immediately
from the definition of I (G), and the symmetry of R is trivial. It remains to show that
R is transitive. So assume that pRq and qRr . Then there exist Γ ′,∆′,Γ ′′,∆′′ such that
Γ ′,Γ ′ ⊆ Γ , ∆′,∆′′ ⊆ ∆, 	GRMImΓ ′ ⇒ ∆′, 	GRMImΓ ′′ ⇒ ∆′′, {p,q} ⊆ At(Γ ′ ⇒ ∆′),
and {q, r} ⊆ At(Γ ′′ ⇒ ∆′′). Since q belongs to both At(Γ ′ ⇒ ∆′) and At(Γ ′′ ⇒ ∆′′),
Lemma 15 entails that 	GRMImΓ ′,Γ ′′ ⇒ ∆′,∆′′. But {p, r} ⊆ {p,q, r} ⊆ At(Γ ′,Γ ′′ ⇒
∆′,∆′′). Hence pRr .
Let C1, . . . ,C be the equivalence classes of R (in some order). Obviously,  has at
most the cardinality of At(G). From the proof of the transitivity of R it also easily follows
that for every 1 i   there exist Γ ′i ⊆ Γ,∆′i ⊆ ∆ such that 	GRMImΓ ′i ⇒ ∆′i and Ci ⊆
At(Γ ′i ⇒ ∆′i ).
We now define a countermodel v of G in A (and so in Aω) as follows:
v(p) =
{
Ii p ∈ Ci,

 p ∈ Γ,p /∈ ∆,
⊥ p /∈ Γ.
To show that v indeed refutes G, we first show by induction on the complexity of ϕ
that if ϕ ∈ Γ then v(ϕ) = ⊥, and if ϕ ∈ ∆ then v(ϕ) = 
. This is obvious in case ϕ is
atomic (including the case ϕ = ⊥, by the special axiom for ⊥ and the fact that G is un-
provable). In case ϕ = ¬ψ the claim follows easily from the induction hypothesis and
conditions (i)–(ii) in the definition of a saturated sequent (Definition 13). If ϕ = ψ1 ⊗ ψ2
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and condition (iii) of Definition 13. Finally assume that ϕ = ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 and ϕ ∈ ∆. So
ϕ ∈ ∆i for some i. Had both Γi ⇒ ∆i,ψ1 | Gi and Γi ⇒ ∆i,ψ2 | Gi been provable,
so would have been G (using our externally additive version of (⇒ ⊗), and the fact that
ϕ ∈ ∆i ). Hence one of these sequents is unprovable. Assume, e.g., that Γi ⇒ ∆i,ψ1 | Gi .
Then ψ1 ∈ ∆i by condition (iv) of Definition 13. Hence v(ψ1) = 
 by induction hypoth-
esis. If v(ψ1) = ⊥ then v(ϕ) = ⊥ = 
. Assume, therefore, that v(ψ1) = Ik for some k.
Then ⊥ /∈ At(ψ1), and v(P ) = Ik for every P ∈ At(ψ1). Hence At(ψ1) ⊆ Ck . By the ob-
servation above concerning Ck there exist Γ ′j ⊆ Γj , ∆′j ⊆ ∆j (j = 1, . . . , n) such that
	GRMImΓ ′ ⇒ ∆′ and At(ψ1) ⊆ Ck ⊆ At(Γ ′ ⇒ ∆′), where Γ ′ =
⋃n
j=1 Γ ′j ,∆′ =
⋃n
j=1 ∆′j .
Hence 	GRMImΓ ′ ⇒ ∆′,ψ1 by Lemma 14. Using the strong splitting rule of GSRMIm,
this implies that 	Γ ′i ⇒ ∆′i ,ψ1 | Gi . It is not possible therefore that 	Γi ⇒ ∆i,ψ2 | Gi ,
since otherwise we would have (using again (⇒ ⊗), and the facts that Γ ′i ⊆ Γi , ∆′i ⊆ ∆i ,
and ϕ ∈ ∆i ) that 	G. It follows by condition (v) of Definition 13 that ψ2 ∈ ∆i , and so
v(ψ2) = 
 by induction hypothesis. If v(ψ2) = ⊥ then again v(ϕ) = ⊥ = 
. Assume
therefore that v(ψ2) = Im for some m. Then again At(ψ2) ⊆ Cm, and there exist Γ ′′j ⊆ Γj ,
∆′′j ⊆ ∆j (j = 1, . . . , n) such that 	GRMImΓ ′′ ⇒ ∆′′ and At(ψ2) ⊆ Cm ⊆ At(Γ ′′ ⇒ ∆′′),
where Γ ′′ =⋃nj=1 Γ ′′j ,∆′′ =⋃nj=1 ∆′′j . Hence 	GRMImΓ ′′ ⇒ ∆′′,ψ2 by Lemma 14. This
and the fact that 	GRMImΓ ′ ⇒ ∆′,ψ1 entail that 	GRMImΓ ′,Γ ′′ ⇒ ∆′,∆′′, ϕ. Since ϕ ∈ ∆,
this fact entails that pRq for every p,q ∈ At(ϕ) (= At(ψ1) ∪ At(ψ2)). It follows that
Ck = Cm and so Ik = Im and v(ϕ) = Ik ⊗ Ik = Ik = ⊥.
Next we observe that if p ∈ I (G) then G | ⇒ is derivable from the axiom p ⇒ p using
strong splittings. It follows that if the empty sequent is a component of G than I (G) is
empty, and so v(p) ∈ {
,⊥} for all p. Hence v refutes the empty sequent in case it is a
component of G.
To show that v is a countermodel of G it remains now only to eliminate the possibility
that there exists 1 i  n and 1 k   such that v(ϕ) = Ik for all ϕ ∈ Γi ∪∆i . Well, had
there been such i and k we would have that v(P ) = Ik for all P ∈ At(Γi ⇒ ∆i), and so
At(Γi ⇒ ∆i) ⊆ Ck (note that ⊥ /∈ At(Γi ⇒ ∆i) in such a case!). Hence there would have
been Γ ′ ⊆ Γ , ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that 	GRMImΓ ′ ⇒ ∆′ and At(Γi ⇒ ∆i) ⊆ Ck ⊆ At(Γ ′ ⇒ ∆′).
Lemma 14 would have implied then that 	GRMImΓi,Γ ′ ⇒ ∆i,∆′. From this it is possible
to derive G using strong splittings (since Γi ⇒ ∆i is a component of G and Γ ′ ⊆ Γ ,
∆′ ⊆ ∆). A contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 4. The “if” part is Theorem 3. The “only if” part is immediate from
Lemmas 17, 18, and 19. 
Theorem 5. A hypersequent G is valid in A1 iff G has a proof in GSRMm in which the cut
rule and the external contraction rule are not used.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of GSRMIm. The main difference is that the form of the
axioms of GRMm implies that the equivalence relation R used in the proof of Lemma 18
has at most one equivalence class (if p and q are in I (G) then {p,q} ⊆ Γ , {p,q} ⊆ ∆ and
	GRMmp,q ⇒ p,q). Hence  1 and the countermodel we get is actually in A1. 
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GSRMm directly, and the proof is therefore simpler than in the case of GSRMIm.
Corollary 5. The cut elimination theorem is valid for GSRMIm and GSRMm. Moreover: if
a hypersequent is provable in either of these systems then it has a proof there in which the
cut rule and the external contraction rule are not used.
Proof. This follows from Theorems 3, 4, and 5. 
Corollary 6. The n-part (Definition 10) of 	hAω (	hA1) is identical to the (external contrac-
tion and cut free) n-part of GSRMIm (GSRMm).
A close examination of the proof of the completeness theorem reveals that this corollary
can be strengthened as follows:
Corollary 7. Let GSRMIm(n) (GSRMm(n)) be the system for hypersequents with n com-
ponents which has as rules the logical rules of GSRMIm (not including cut!) and as axioms
the hypersequents with n components which can be derived from a theorem of GSRMIm
(GSRMm) using strong splittings. Then a hypersequent G with n components is valid in
Aω (A1) iff it has a proof in GSRMIm(n) (GSRMm(n)).
Corollary 8. A sequent is valid inAω (A1) iff it has a (cut-free) proof in GRMIm (GRMm).
Hence the cut rule is admissible in GRMIm and GRMm.
Corollary 9. GSRMIm (GSRMm) is a conservative extension of GRMIm (GRMm).
Note. The cut-elimination part of Corollary 5 was first stated (with a hint for a very com-
plicated syntactical proof) in [9]. This is the first time it is given a real (and much simpler)
proof. That external contraction can also be eliminated is a new result. Corollaries 9 and 8
were first proved in [9] and [3] (respectively).
3.3. Compactness and characterizations of the consequence relations
We turn now to a proof-theoretical characterization of 	Aω and 	A1 using our hyperse-
quential calculi (this, recall, was the main motivation for introducing these calculi, because
for characterizing the logically valid formulas the purely sequential fragments suffice).
The most standard way of using a sequential calculus G for defining a (Tarskian) con-
sequence relation is to let T 	Gϕ iff there exists a finite Γ ⊆ T such that 	GΓ ⇒ ϕ.
This method is not applicable here, because p ⊗ q 	Aω p, but neither p ⊗ q ⇒ p nor⇒ p is provable even in GSRMm (since both are not valid in A1). Another common way
to use G for this purpose is to let T 	eG ϕ if the sequent ⇒ ϕ is derivable in G from
the set of sequents {⇒ ψ | ψ ∈ T }. This method does work for GSRMIm and GSRMm,
since 	eGSRMIm= 	Aω and 	eGSRMm= 	A1 (see Corollary 13 below). It is not very useful,
though, so a better one should be sought. Now in classical logic ⇒ ϕ is derivable from
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uation v which assigns 
 to all sequents of this set. This characterization is based on the
role of 
 (and of principle (T)). An equivalent characterization, based on the role of ⊥
(which is more natural here), is that there is no valuation v which assigns ⊥ to all ele-
ments of {⇒ ϕ}∪ {ψ⇒ | ψ ∈ T }. This formulation relies, however, on the assumption that
ψ ⇒ can be true only if ψ is not true. This is a variant of principle (T) which fails in our
framework. This can be remedied by using instead the (classically equivalent) condition
that there is no valuation v which assigns ⊥ to all elements of {⇒ ϕ} ∪ {ψ ⇒ ϕ | ψ ∈ T }.
This characterization can be used in the case of 	Aω and 	A1 . This line of thought leads
to the following definitions and propositions:
Definition 14. A set S of sequents is called negatively satisfiable (n-satisfiable in short) in
Aω (A1) if there exists a valuation v there which is not a model of any element of S.
Proposition 1. A finite set {s1, . . . , sn} of sequents is n-satisfiable inAω (A1) iff the hyper-
sequent s1 | · · · | sn is not valid there.
Proposition 2. For a theory T and a formula ϕ let ST ,ϕ = {⇒ ϕ} ∪ {ψ ⇒ ϕ | ψ ∈ T }.
Then T 	Aω ϕ (T 	A1 ϕ) iff ST ,ϕ is not n-satisfiable in Aω (A1).
The two propositions easily follow from the relevant definitions. Together they yield the
following characterization of 	Aω (	A1) in the case of finite theories:
Proposition 3. {ψ1, . . . ,ψn} 	Aω ϕ iff the hypersequent ⇒ ϕ | ψ1 ⇒ ϕ | · · · | ψn ⇒ ϕ is
valid in Aω. A similar result holds for A1.
Another, equivalent characterization is:
Corollary 10. If Γ is finite then Γ 	Aω ϕ (Γ 	A1 ϕ) iff Γ ⇒ ϕ | ⇒ ϕ is valid inAω (A1).
Proof. It is easy to see that ⇒ ϕ | ψ1 ⇒ ϕ | · · · | ψn ⇒ ϕ is valid in Aω iff ψ1, . . . ,ψn ⇒
ϕ | ⇒ ϕ is valid there. The same applies to A1. 
In order to generalize these characterizations to arbitrary theories we need the following
Theorem 6 (Compactness theorem). Let S be a set of sequents such that every finite subset
of S is n-satisfiable in Aω (A1). Then S itself is n-satisfiable there.
Proof. We do here the case of Aω. We may assume without a loss in generality that S is
a maximal set of sequents with the property that every finite subset of it is n-satisfiable.
Hence by Proposition 1 a sequent s is not in S iff there exist s1, . . . , sk ∈ S such that
	h s1 | · · · | sk | s (while there exist no s1, . . . , sk ∈ S such that 	h s1 | · · · | sk).Aω Aω
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in Aω of all the sequents of S is similar to that in the proof of Lemma 19. We define:
Γ =
⋃
α∈I
Γα, ∆ =
⋃
α∈I
∆α,
I (S) = {p ∈ At(S) | p ∈ Γ ∩∆},
R = {〈p,q〉 ∈ I (S)2 | ∃Γ ′ ⊆ Γ ∃∆′ ⊆ ∆.	GRMImΓ ′ ⇒ ∆′ and
{p,q} ⊆ At(Γ ′ ⇒ ∆′)}.
Again R is an equivalence relation. Let C1,C2, . . . be the equivalence classes of R in
some order (the set of equivalence classes may be finite or countable). Again it can easily
be proved that if C′i is a finite subset of Ci then there exist Γi ⊆ Γ,∆i ⊆ ∆ such that	GRMImΓi ⇒ ∆i and C′i ⊆ At(Γi ⇒ ∆i).
We define now our countermodel v exactly as in the proof of Lemma 19, and again first
show by induction on the complexity of ϕ that if ϕ ∈ Γ then v(ϕ) = ⊥, and if ϕ ∈ ∆ then
v(ϕ) = 
. As before, this is obvious in case ϕ is atomic. Assume next that ϕ = ¬ψ and ϕ ∈
Γ . Then there exists α ∈ I s.t. ϕ ∈ Γα . Assume that Γα ⇒ ψ,∆α is not in S. Then there ex-
ist s1, . . . , sk ∈ S such that 	hAωs1 | · · · | sk | Γα ⇒ ψ,∆α . Since ¬ψ ∈ Γα , this entails that
	hAω s1 | . . . | sk | Γα ⇒ ∆α . This contradicts the basic property of S. It follows that ψ ∈ ∆,
and so v(ψ) = 
 by the induction hypothesis. Hence v(ϕ) = ⊥. The cases where ϕ = ¬ψ
and ϕ ∈ ∆ and where ϕ = ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 and ϕ ∈ Γ are similarly handled. Finally assume that
ϕ = ψ1 ⊗ψ2 and ϕ ∈ ∆. So ϕ ∈ ∆α for some α ∈ I . It is impossible that both Γα ⇒ ∆α,ψ1
and Γα ⇒ ∆α,ψ2 are not in S, since in such a case there would exist s1, . . . , sk ∈ S such
that 	hAω s1 | · · · | sk | Γα ⇒ ∆α,ψ1 and 	hAω s1 | · · · | sk | Γα ⇒ ∆α,ψ2, and this implies
that 	hAω s1 | · · · | sk | Γα ⇒ ∆α (since ϕ = ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ ∆α). A contradiction. Assume, ac-
cordingly, that Γα ⇒ ∆α,ψ1 (say) is in S. Then ψ1 ∈ ∆, and so v(ψ1) = 
 by induction
hypothesis. If v(ψ1) = ⊥ then v(ϕ) = ⊥ = 
. Assume, therefore, that v(ψ1) = Ik for some
k. Then ⊥ /∈ At(ψ1), and v(P ) = Ik for every P ∈ At(ψ1). Hence At(ψ1) ⊆ Ck , and so
there exist Γ ′ ⊆ Γ , ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that 	GRMImΓ ′ ⇒ ∆′ and At(ψ1) ⊆ At(Γ ′ ⇒ ∆′). Hence
	GRMImΓ ′ ⇒ ∆′,ψ1 by Lemma 14. By the soundness of strong splitting, this implies that
there exist s′1, . . . , s′k ∈ S such that 	hAωs′1 | · · · | s′k | ⇒ ψ1. It is impossible therefore that
Γα ⇒ ∆α,ψ2 is not in S, since in such a case there would exist s′′1 , . . . , s′′l ∈ S such that
	hAωs′′1 | · · · | s′′l | Γα ⇒ ∆α,ψ2, and together with 	hAω s′1 | · · · | s′k | ⇒ ψ1 we would get
that 	hAωs′1 | · · · | s′k | s′′1 | . . . | s′′l | Γα ⇒ ∆α (since ϕ = ψ1 ⊗ψ2 ∈ ∆α). A contradiction. It
follows that ψ2 ∈ ∆, and so v(ψ2) = 
 by induction hypothesis. If v(ψ2) = ⊥ then again
v(ϕ) = ⊥ = 
. Assume therefore that v(ψ2) = Im for some m. Then again At(ψ2) ⊆ Cm,
and there exist Γ ′′ ⊆ Γ , ∆′′ ⊆ ∆ such that 	GRMImΓ ′′ ⇒ ∆′′ and At(ψ2) ⊆ At(Γ ′′ ⇒ ∆′′),
Hence 	GRMIm Γ ′′ ⇒ ∆′′,ψ2 by Lemma 14. This and the fact that 	GRMImΓ ′ ⇒ ∆′,ψ1
entail that 	GRMImΓ ′,Γ ′′ ⇒ ∆′,∆′′, ϕ. Since ϕ ∈ ∆, this fact entails that pRq for every
p,q ∈ At(ϕ). It follows that Ck = Cm and so Ik = Im and v(ϕ) = Ik ⊗ Ik = Ik = ⊥.
Assume now that the empty sequent is in S. Than I (S) is empty, since if p ∈ I (S)
then p ∈ Γα1 ∩ ∆α2 for some α1, α2 ∈ I , and so {⇒,Γα1 ⇒ ∆α1 ,Γα2 ⇒ ∆α2} is not
n-satisfiable. It follows that v refutes the empty sequent in case it is in S.
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the possibility that there exists α ∈ I and k such that v(ϕ) = Ik for all ϕ ∈ Γα ∪ ∆α .
Well, had there been such α and k we would have that v(P ) = Ik for all P ∈ At(Γα ⇒
∆α), and so At(Γα ⇒ ∆α) ⊆ Ck . Hence there would have been Γ ′ ⊆ Γ , ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such
that 	GRMImΓ ′ ⇒ ∆′ and At(Γα ⇒ ∆α) ⊆ At(Γ ′ ⇒ ∆′). Lemma 14 would have implied
then that 	GRMImΓα,Γ ′ ⇒ ∆α,∆′. By the soundness of strong splittings this entails that
	hAωs1 | · · · | sk | Γα ⇒ ∆α , for some s1, . . . , sk ∈ S. A contradiction (since Γα ⇒ ∆α is
also in S). 
Corollary 11. 	Aω is finitary: T 	Aω ϕ iff there exists a finite subset Γ of T such that
Γ 	Aω ϕ. The same is true for 	A1 .
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 6 and Proposition 2. 
The following theorem and its corollary provide our best syntactic characterization of
	Aω (	A1) in terms of GSRMIm (GSRMm):
Theorem 7. T 	Aω ϕ (T 	A1 ϕ) iff there exists a finite subset Γ of T such that Γ ⇒ ϕ |⇒ ϕ is provable in GSRMIm (GSRMm) without using cut or external contraction.
Proof. This follows from Corollaries 11 and 10, and Theorems 4 and 5. 
Corollary 12.
(1) A formula ϕ is valid in Aω iff ⇒ ϕ has a cut-free proof in the 1-part of GSRMIm
(which is just GRMIm). Similar relations hold between 	A1 and the 1-part of GSRMm
(GSRMm).
(2) T 	Aω ϕ (T 	A1 ϕ) iff there exists a finite subset Γ of T such that Γ ⇒ ϕ | ⇒ ϕ has
a cut-free (and external contraction-free) proof in the 2-part of GSRMIm (GSRMm).
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 7 and Corollary 6. 
Another important characterization of 	Aω (	A1) in terms of GSRMIm (GSRMm) is
given in the following corollary:
Corollary 13. T 	Aω ϕ (T 	A1 ϕ) iff the sequent ⇒ ϕ is derivable in the 2-part of
GSRMIm (GSRMm) from the set of sequents {⇒ ψ | ψ ∈ T }.
Proof. The “if” part follows from the soundness of the rules of GSRMIm (GSRMm). The
“only if” part follows from Corollary 12, since ⇒ ϕ is derivable from Γ ⇒ ϕ | ⇒ ϕ and
the set {⇒ ψ | ψ ∈ Γ } using n cuts followed by an external contraction. 
Both of the two last corollaries mean that for characterizing the consequence relation
induced by Aω (A1) only the 2-part of GSRMIm (GSRMm) is needed!
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been proved in [9]. A weak version of Theorem 7, in which only the possibility of elimi-
nating cuts is mentioned, was also claimed (without a proof) in [9]. All other results of this
subsection are new.
3.4. Hilbert-type systems
For the sake of completeness, we present now the Hilbert-type systems for our logics
given in [3,9] (with new proofs of their completeness). For this it is preferable to take →
as primitive.
The system HRMIm.
Axioms.
(I) A → A (Identity)
(T) (A → B) → ((B → C) → (A → C)) (Transitivity)
(P) (A → (B → C)) → (B → (A → C)) (Permutation)
(R1) (A → (B → C)) → (A⊗B → C) (Residuation)(R2) (A⊗B → C) → (A → (B → C))
(C) A → A⊗A (Contraction)
(M) A⊗A → A (Mingle)
(N1) (A → ∼B) → (B → ∼A) (Contraposition)
(N2) ∼∼A → A (Double negation)
(F) ⊥ → A (Falsehood)
Rule of inference.
A A → B
B
Note. Instead of leaving ⊗ as primitive, we could have defined it by ϕ ⊗ ψ =Df ∼(ϕ →
∼ψ) (This equivalence is a theorem of the version we have preferred here.) Axiom (F) can
and should be deleted if we are interested only in the pure intensional language IL.
Proposition 4.
(1) 	GRMIm⇒ ϕ iff 	HRMImϕ.
More generally: 	GRMImϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ψ1, . . . ,ψk if and only if 	HRMIm∼ϕ1 +∼ϕ2 +
· · · +∼ϕn +ψ1 + · · · +ψk .
(2) T 	HRMIm ϕ iff there exists a finite Γ ⊆ T such that 	GRMIm Γ ⇒ ϕ.
Proof. The proof of the first part of Proposition 4 with the help of the admissible cut rule
is standard. The second part follows from the first using the relevant deduction theorem for
HRMIm (see Proposition 5). 
Definition 15. HSRMIm is the system which is obtained from HRMIm by adding A⊗BA as
an extra rule of inference.
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Proof. By Proposition 4 all axioms of HSRMIm are valid in Aω , and it is easy to check
that its two rules of inference are also sound with respect to Aω. Hence the “if” part.
For the converse, assume T 	Aω ϕ. Then by Theorem 7 there exists a finite subset Γ ={ψ1, . . . ,ψn} of T such that Γ ⇒ ϕ |⇒ ϕ is provable in GSRMIm. Now from each of the
two components of this hypersequent it is easy to derive (using the provability of ψi ⇒ ψi
and n applications of (⇒ ⊗)) the sequent Γ ⇒ ϕ ⊗ψ , where ψ = ψ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ψn. Hence
this sequent is provable in GSRMIm (using an external contraction), and so also in GRMIm
(by Corollary 9). It follows by Proposition 4 that T 	HRMIm ϕ ⊗ ψ , and so T 	HSRMIm ϕ
(using a single application of the extra rule of HSRMIm). 
Definition 16. HRMm is the system which is obtained from HRMIm by adding to it the
axiom ∼(A → A) → (B → B). HSRMm is the system which is obtained from HRMm by
adding A⊗B
A
as an extra rule of inference.
Theorem 9. T 	A1 ϕ iff T 	HRMm ϕ.
Proof. Similar to that of Theorem 8. 
4. Relations with other logics
4.1. Relations with relevance logic
Our logic is based on the purely intensional fragment of relevance logic.11 Indeed, the
basic language IL is exactly that of the “intensional” fragment of the relevant logic R,12
and the 1-part of the IL-fragment of our logic strictly belongs to the family of intensional
relevance logics. In fact, it is a very close relative of R ∼→ (which in our opinion is superior
to R ∼→).
The connections (and the differences) are the following:
(1) GRMI ∼→, the IL-fragment of GRMIm, is almost identical to GR ∼→, the calculus given
for R ∼→ in [13]. Indeed, both systems are obtained from the classical Gentzen-type
system by deleting its structural rule of weakening (and using the multiplicative ver-
sions of its other rules). The main difference is that in GR ∼→ the two sides of a sequent
basically consist of multisets of formulas rather than of sets (as in GRMI ∼→), and the
structural rule of contraction (but not its converse!) is therefore added. (Note that the
constant ⊥ has also been considered and used in the relevance literature, as well as in
Linear Logic, and the axiom used for it in GRMIm is practically the same as the one
used for it in [15].)
11 In [7] we have argued in length that this is the only fragment that is well motivated.
12 This fragment is denoted by R∼→ in the relevant literature, like [1,2,13]. Note that the relevantists prefer to
take the relevant implication → as primitive rather than ⊗, which is preferred here for purely technical reasons.
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which defines R ∼→) by adding to it Axiom (M) (Section 3.4). This addition turns the
intensional conjunction ⊗ into a fully idempotent connective.
(3) In both HR ∼→ and HRMI ∼→ the implication connective → enjoys some relevant de-
duction theorems. These theorems are reviewed in the next proposition (the proofs are
standard—see e.g. [8]).
Proposition 5.
(1) For L = HR ∼→, HRMI ∼→ and HRM ∼→ (or any other extension of HR ∼→ by axiom
schemes) T ,A 	L B iff either T 	L B or T 	L A → B .
(2) 	HR∼→ ϕ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ϕn → ψ iff there is a proof in HR ∼→ of ψ from the multiset[ϕ1, . . . , ϕn] in which each element of this multiset is used at least once (the same
applies to any extension of HR ∼→ by axiom schemes).(3) 	HRMI ∼→ ϕ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ϕn → ψ iff there is a proof in HRMI ∼→ of ψ from the set{ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} in which each element of this set is used at least once (the same applies
to any extension of HRMI ∼→ by axiom schemes, e.g.: HRMIm or HRMm).
These deduction theorems are no longer valid when we pass from the logic induced by
the 1-part of 	Aω to the full logic (as the example of p⊗q 	Aω p shows). Instead we have
there the following relevant deduction theorem:
Theorem 10. Call a sentence ϕ fully relevant to a sentence ψ if At(ϕ) ⊆ At(ψ). If ϕ is
fully relevant to ψ then T , ϕ 	Aω ψ iff T 	Aω ϕ → ψ (the same is true for any An).
Proof. Assume that T , ϕ 	Aω ψ , and that v(φ) = ⊥ for all φ ∈ T . If v(ϕ) = ⊥ then
v(ϕ → ψ) = 
. Otherwise v(ψ) = ⊥ (since T , ϕ 	Aω ψ ). If v(ψ) = 
 then again v(ϕ →
ψ) = 
. If v(ψ) = Ik for some k then also v(ϕ) = Ik (by the Isolation property and the
fact that At(ϕ) ⊆ At(ψ)), and so v(ϕ → ψ) = Ik = ⊥ in this case as well.
The converse is easy and is left to the reader. 
We note finally that in [3] it was shown that the implication → has in the IL-fragment
of our logic the crucial variable-sharing property, which is the main characteristic of rele-
vance logics:
Theorem 11. If 	Aω ϕ → ψ (where ϕ and ψ are in IL) than ϕ and ψ share a variable.
Proof. This follows from the fact that I1 → I2 = ⊥: If ϕ and ψ share no variable we can
assign I1 to all the atomic formulas of ϕ and I2 to all the atomic formulas of ψ . We shall
get that v(ϕ) = I1, v(ψ) = I2, and v(ϕ → ψ) = ⊥. 
Note. Using Theorem 1, a similar proof can show that for every binary relation ∗ definable
in IL, either ∗ or its complement ∗¯ (defined by ϕ ∗¯ψ = ∼(ϕ ∗ψ) has in 	Aω (and so also
in R ∼→) the variable-sharing property (whether it is ∗¯ or ∗ depends on whether I1 ∗ I2 = 

or I1 ∗ I2 = ⊥). We note also that in the full language one should add to the claim made
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to 
. The proof is similar.
4.2. Relations with classical logic
We next show that classical logic (CL) can be identified with a special fragment of our
logic. For this we associate with each n-ary operation on Aω definable in IL⊥ (or just
IL) its restriction to {
,⊥}n. In particular: we associate classical conjunction with ⊗,
and classical negation with ∼ (and so classical implication is associated with →, classical
disjunction with +, etc.). The following theorem should be understood accordingly.
Theorem 12.
(1) A sequent s is classically valid iff s |⇒ is valid in Aω (iff it is provable in GSRMIm
without using cut or external contraction).
(2) T 	CL ϕ iff there exists a finite subset Γ of T such that Γ ⇒ ϕ | ⇒ has a cut-free (and
external contraction-free) proof in the 2-part of GSRMIm.
Proof. The first part immediately follows from the semantic definitions (especially the
definition of a model of the empty sequent). The second part follows from the first, Corol-
lary 6, and well-known properties of 	CL. 
Notes.
(1) The second part of Theorem 12 should be compared with the second part of Corol-
lary 12!
(2) Theorem 12 remains valid if we restrict ourselves to the IL-fragment of GSRMIm.
(3) Theorem 12 is easily seen to imply both the completeness of the usual Gentzen-type
system for classical propositional logic, as well as the cut elimination theorem for
it. In fact, a splitting in a cut-free and external contraction-free proof in GSRMIm of
s | ⇒ amounts to a generalized form of weakening applied to some subsequent of s
(in which more than one formula is added). A proof of s | ⇒ in GSRMIm exactly
simulates therefore a special type of a cut-free proof of s in a Gentzen-type system
for CL.
We next show that CL can be taken as a sublogic of 	Aω also from another point of
view: it can be interpreted in 	Aω .
Definition 17. ϕ ⊃ ψ =Df ϕ → ϕ ⊗ψ , ϕ ∨¯ψ =Df (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ψ .
Theorem 13 [9]. The {⊗, ∨¯,⊃,⊥}-fragment of 	Aω is identical to classical logic (where
these connectives are respectively taken as the interpretations of classical conjunction,
disjunction, implication, and falsehood).
A. Avron / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 133–160 157Proof. It can easily be checked that a ⊗ b is true (i.e. a ⊗ b = ⊥) iff both a and b are true,
a ∨¯ b is true iff either a is true or b is true, a ⊃ b is true iff either a is not true or b is true,
and ⊥ is of course never true. 
Notes.
(1) It follows from this theorem that the IL-fragment of our logic is sufficient for in-
terpreting positive classical logic. It is easy however to see that the strong isolation
condition (see Lemma 5) entails that no faithful interpretation of classical negation is
available in it.
(2) ⊃ is in fact an implication connective for 	Aω as a whole, since it is easy to see that the
following deduction theorem from [9] obtains for it: T , ϕ 	Aω ψ iff T 	Aω ϕ ⊃ ψ .
(3) The interpretation of classical negation is defined of course in the language {⊗, ∨¯,⊃,
⊥} as ¬ϕ =Df ϕ ⊃ ⊥ (which is equivalent to ϕ → ⊥). It is easy to see that ¬a is
true iff a is not true. Note also that the languages {⊗, ∨¯,⊃,⊥} and {⊗, ∨¯,⊃,¬} are
equivalent, since ⊥ is equivalent in Aω to ¬ϕ ⊗ ϕ, where ϕ is arbitrary.
The following propositions provide two other connections between our logic and clas-
sical logic:
Theorem 14 (Substitution of classical equivalents). Let A and B be two classically equiv-
alent formulas in the language {⊗, ∨¯,⊃,⊥} such that At(A) = At(B). Let the formula ψ
be obtained from the formula ϕ of IL⊥ by replacing some occurrences of A in ϕ by B .
Then 	Aω ϕ ↔ ψ .
Proof. Let v be a valuation in Aω. By Theorem 13 A ⊃ B and B ⊃ A are both valid in
Aω. This implies that v(A) = v(B) in case both v(A) and v(B) are in {
,⊥}. On the other
hand the fact that At(A) = At(B) entails that v(A) = Ik for some k iff v(B) = Ik (note that
this is impossible if ⊥ ∈ At(A) = At(B)). It follows that v(A) = v(B) in all cases, and so
v(ϕ) = v(ψ) for all v. Hence ϕ ↔ ψ is valid in Aω. 
Proposition 6. Let ψ be a formula of IL in which exactly one atomic formula P occurs. If
ψ is a classical tautology (with ∼ and ⊗ interpreted as negation and conjunction, respec-
tively), then ψ is valid in Aω.
Proof. Let v be a valuation in Aω. If v(P ) = Ik for some k then v(ψ) = Ik by Theorem 1.
If v(P ) ∈ {
,⊥} then v behaves with respect to ψ like a classical valuation, and so v(ψ) =

 (since ψ is a classical tautology). In either case v(ψ) = ⊥. 
4.3. Relations with paraconsistent logics
We finally turn to investigate the relations between our logic and da Costa’s family of
paraconsistent logics. We start with the trivial observation that with respect to ∼ even 	A1
is paraconsistent:
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This proposition is true in fact not only for ∼, but for any other “negation” that one
might try to define in IL. Moreover, we have the following stronger result:
Proposition 8. No finite theory Γ in IL is trivial in 	A1 : if Q does not occur in Γ then
Γ A1 Q.
Proof. Let v be the valuation which assigns ⊥ to Q and I1 to any other atomic variable.
Then by Theorem 1 v is a model of Γ which is not a model of Q. 
The value of 	Aω (and 	A1 ) as a paraconsistent logic is due not only to these negative
results, but also to the following positive one:
Proposition 9. A hypersequent G is valid inAω (A1) under the assumption that ϕ1, . . . , ϕn
are all “normal” (i.e.: G is true for any v which assigns to ϕ1, . . . , ϕn truth value in {
,⊥})
iff G | ⇒ ϕ1 ⊗∼ϕ1 | · · · | ⇒ ϕn ⊗ ∼ϕn is valid in Aω .
This proposition (the easy proof of which we leave to the reader) is important because
it makes it possible to use within Aω default assumptions of the form “the formula ψ is
normal” (and classical logic when it seems safe) by applying nonmonotonically the rule:
from G | ⇒ ϕ ⊗∼ϕ infer G.
We next show that the IL-fragment of 	Aω is a proper extension of da Costa’s basic
paraconsistent logic Cω [11]. Identifying ∼, ⊗, ∨¯, and ⊃ (respectively) with the negation,
conjunction, disjunction, and implication of Cω we have:
Proposition 10. The {∼,⊗, ∨¯,⊃}-fragment of 	Aω is a proper extension of Cω. This re-
mains true if we replace ⊗ by any other binary connective & such that a &b = ⊥ iff either
a = ⊥ or b = ⊥.
Proof. Cω is obtained from positive classical logic by adding to it as axioms excluded
middle (∼ψ ∨¯ ψ) and double negation elimination (∼∼ψ ⊃ ψ). Hence Theorem 13
and Proposition 6 imply that 	Aω is an extension of Cω. Proposition 6 implies also that	Aωψ ⊃ ∼∼ψ . Since this schema is not derivable in Cω, 	Aω is in fact a proper extension
of Cω. 
Cω is the weakest logic in the sequence {Ci}ωi=1 of da Costa’s paraconsistent logics. We
turn now to compare the {∼,⊗, ∨¯,⊃}-fragment of 	Aω (which we denote by 	pacAω in what
follows) with the strongest logic in this sequence: C1. We first note three big advantages
that 	pacAω has over C1:
• C1 is paraconsistent only with respect to ∼, but it is possible to define within it an-
other negation with respect to which it is not paraconsistent. By Proposition 8 this is
impossible in 	pac , and so this logic is absolutely paraconsistent.Aω
A. Avron / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 133–160 159• While the choice of the basic axioms concerning ∼ in C1 seems quite arbitrary (why
is ∼∼ψ ⊃ ψ accepted while its converse is not?), Proposition 6 implies that in 	pacAω
all classical tautologies of this type are accepted.
• Equivalence in C1 is never a real equivalence, since substitution of equivalents always
fails in the context of negation. Thus even ∼(ϕ ∨¯ψ) and ∼(ψ ∨¯ϕ) are not equivalent in
C1 (although both (ϕ ∨¯ψ) ⊃ (ψ ∨¯ϕ) and its converse are theorems). By Theorem 14,
in contrast, A can be substituted for B whenever A and B are (instances of) positive
equivalent formulas of 	pacAω having the same atomic variables. The same is true (by
Proposition 6) if A and B are (instances of) classically equivalent formulas s.t. At(A) =
At(B) = {P } (thus in 	pacAω the formula ϕ can always be substituted for ∼∼ϕ, and vice
versa).
On the other hand C1 has the advantage that it is possible to express within its language
the assumption that a given formula should be taken as “normal” (i.e. its truth value should
be in {
,⊥}). This normality of a formula ϕ is defined by ϕ◦ =Df ∼(∼ϕ &ϕ) (where
& is the official conjunction of the system). This makes it possible to use full classical
logic within C1 under the assumption that certain formulas are normal. Thus the most
characteristic axiom of this system allows to infer ∼ϕ from ϕ ⊃ ψ , ϕ ⊃ ∼ψ , and ψ◦.
Proposition 9 provides some substitute for this property of C1 in the case of 	pacAω , but
normality is not expressible within the language of this logic. It is easy in fact to show
(using Theorem 1) that one cannot define in IL a unary connective  such that (P ),Q ⊃
P,Q ⊃ ∼P 	A1 ∼Q. This shortcoming (?) can be remedied in the full language IL⊥ at
the cost of losing the first advantage of 	pacAω over C1 which we have noted above.
Definition 18. ϕ &ψ =Df ϕ ⊗ψ ⊗ 
.
Note that v(ϕ &ψ) is ⊥ iff either v(ϕ) = ⊥ or v(ψ) = ⊥, and v(ϕ &ψ) = 
 otherwise.
Hence if we define ϕ◦ =Df ∼(∼ϕ &ϕ) then v(ϕ◦) = 
 if v(ϕ) ∈ {
,⊥}, and v(ϕ◦) = ⊥
otherwise. Using this fact, Proposition 10 and some routine checks it is easy to prove:
Theorem 15. The {∼,&, ∨¯,⊃}-fragment of 	Aω is a proper extension of C1.
Note. The {∼,&, ∨¯,⊃}-fragment of 	Aω is a paraconsistent logic which still has over
C1 the second and third advantages noted above. In addition it is sensitive to relevance
considerations, and it has both simple semantics and a nice proof system. These properties
make it (so we believe) superior to C1 or to any other paraconsistent logic which has been
suggested in the literature.
A final note:A1 can be taken as the restriction of J3 (the strongest logic produced by da
Costa’s school), to the language described in Corollary 4. Indeed the two structures have
the same (designated) truth-values, and the connectives of IL⊥ are definable in J3 (see
[4]).
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